
















After  seven  decades  of  episodic  existence  through  conferences,  the  Pan-­‐‑African  project  
became   permanently   institutionalised   with   the   founding   of   the   Organisation   of   African  
Unity  in  1963,  with  a  qualitative  upgrade  into  the  African  Union  in  2002.  
Much  academic  literature  on  African  integration  and  the  OAU-­‐‑AU  is  pessimistic.  Most  
media  commentary  is  dismissive  of  the  AU,  and  derogatory  of  the  Pan-­‐‑African  Parliament.  
This  article  seeks  to  trace  the  on-­‐‑going  evolution  of  the  OAU-­‐‑AU,  and  enquire  how  the  AU  
stands  up   to   contemporary   regional  organisations.  This  makes   it   focus  on  operationalised  
ground  truth,  rather  than  entities  which  exist  mostly  on  paper.  
The  African  Union  and  its  regional  communities  have  achieved  significantly  more  -­‐‑  and  
attempted   vastly   more   -­‐‑   than   a   score   of   contemporaries   such   as   the   Organisation   of  
American  States,   the  League  of  Arab  States,   the  Association  of   South-­‐‑East  Asian  Nations,  
and   the   Southern   Common  Market.      Among   regional   communities,   the  African  Union   is  
arguably  second  in  accomplishments  to  only  the  European  Union,  which  has  a  three  orders  
of  magnitude  larger  budget  and  personnel  establishment.     The  African  Union’s  operations  
focus  on  peace-­‐‑making,  while   its   institution-­‐‑building  focuses  on  economic   integration  and  
development.  
The   on-­‐‑going   evolution   of   the   African   Union   family   of   associations   today   shows   a  
complexity   interwoven   with   subsidiary   inter-­‐‑governmental   organisations,   Quasi-­‐‑
Nongovernmental   Organisations   (Quangos),   and   civil   society   non-­‐‑governmental  
organisations.  Its  constitutional  mandates  and  judicial  activism  show  repeated  contestation  
between  autocratic  regimes  and  advocates  of  the  rule  of  law  and  democratisation.  The  “soft  
law”   of   regional   judiciaries   presses   beyond   inter-­‐‑governmentalism   towards   assertions   of  
supra-­‐‑national   authority.   This   article  will   then   conclude  with   an   assessment  of   the   trends  
and  the  future  of  African  integration.  
  
     
JOURNAL  OF  AFRICAN  UNION  STUDIES  
Volume  1,  Issue  1  2012  
	  
  The  African  Union  and  its  sub-­‐‑regional  Structures	  
10  
  
An  Overview  of  Pan-­‐‑Africanism  
  
Most   of   the   literature   on   the   Pan-­‐‑African  project   -­‐‑   to   unify  Africa,   and  her   diaspora–
has  several  gaps.  First,  a  book  or  article  conceptualizes  Pan-­‐‑Africanism  in  the   narrowest  
possible   sense   of   inter-­‐‑governmental   organisations,   excluding   both   corporate   and   civil  
society   activities.   Second,   even   in   analysing   inter-­‐‑governmental   organisations,   books   and  
articles   typically   consider   only   either   the   Organisation   of   African   Unity   /   African   Union  
(OAU/   AU),   or   one   or   more   regional   economic   communities,   ignoring   a   host   of   treaties  
which   explicitly   define   these   regional   communities   as   the   geographic   and   organisational  
cornerstones   for   the   AU,   its   security   architecture,   and   its   proposed   African   Economic  
Community.  
The   complex   chronology   of   the   Pan-­‐‑African   project   starts   with   non-­‐‑state   actors:  
conferences   of   civil   society   amongst   the   African   diaspora,   which   from   the   start   also  
included   intellectuals   from   the   continent.   It   then   evolves   to   become   state-­‐‑centric,   and  
culminates  in  beginning  to  re-­‐‑incorporate  civil  society.  
The  choice  of  venue  for  the  early  Pan-­‐‑African  congresses  indicates  priority  for  lobbying  
the   Versailles   conference   of   1919,   and   lobbying   in   the   capitals   of   the   four   vanished  
imperialist   empires   that   then   ruled  Africa.1      The  mid-­‐‑twentieth   century  marks   the   home-­‐‑
coming   of   Pan-­‐‑African   congresses   to   the   continent.   Analysis   of   the   1958   first   All-­‐‑Africa  
People’s  Conference,  in  Accra,  capital  of  newly-­‐‑independent  Ghana,  shows  three  interesting  
developments.  It  was  the  first  to  be  held  on  African  soil.  Second,  Kwame  Nkrumah,  Prime  
Minister   of   Ghana,   the   first   black   colony   in   Africa   to   win   independence,   gave   Pan-­‐‑
Africanism   a   continental   rather   than   ethnic   focus.   The   Conference   included   both   the  
Algerian  liberation  movement  (the  Arab  FLN),  and  the  Liberal  Party  of  South  Africa,  led  by  
mostly  white  South  Africans.      
Third,   from   this   point   on,   inter-­‐‑governmental   organisations   overshadowed   the  
remaining   civil   society   conferences.   Pan-­‐‑Africanism   became   dominated   by   a   state-­‐‑centric  
narrative,   one  of   the  unintended   consequences  of  which  was   to  marginalise   the  diaspora.  
While   the   literature   conventionally   names   and   numbers   five   Pan-­‐‑African   congresses,  
research  traces  at  least  twelve.  (See  Table  1)  State-­‐‑centrism  means  that  little  of  the  literature  
even  list   the  second  and  third  All-­‐‑African  People’s  Conferences,  nor  the  sixth  and  seventh  
Pan-­‐‑African  congresses.  But,  however  overshadowed  by  presidential  summits  and  the  OAU  
they   were,   these   four   civil   society   conferences   did   occur,   alongside   the   state-­‐‑centric  
institutionalisation   of   Pan-­‐‑Africanism.   The   turning   of   the   circle   started   in   2004,   with   the  
AU’s   Economic,   Social   and   Cultural   Council   (ECOSOCC)   statute   making   provision   for  
twenty-­‐‑four   non-­‐‑governmental   organisations   (NGOs)   from   civil   society,   plus   twenty  
diaspora   organisations   represented   alongside   the   majority   from   Africa.   Episodic  
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CHRONOLOGY:  PAN-­‐‑AFRICAN  CIVIL  SOCIETY  CONFERENCES  
  
1893:  Congress  on  Africa,  Chicago:  name  “Pan-­‐‑Africanism”  coined.  
1900:  Pan-­‐‑African  Congress,  London.  
1919:  “First”  Pan-­‐‑African  Congress.  Paris.  
1921:  “Second”  Pan-­‐‑African  Congress.  London,  Paris  &  Brussels.  
1920s:  “Africa  for  the  Africans”:  zenith  years  of  U.N.I.A.  branches  in  Africa.  
1923:  “Third”  Pan-­‐‑African  Congress,  London  &  Lisbon  
1927:  “Fourth”  Pan-­‐‑African  Congress,  New  York.  
1945:  “Fifth”  Pan-­‐‑African  Congress,  Manchester.  
1958:    First  All-­‐‑Africa  People’s  Conference,  Accra.  
1960:    Second  All-­‐‑Africa  People’s  Conference,  Tunis.  
1961:    Third  All-­‐‑Africa  People’s  Conference,  Cairo.    
1974:  “Sixth”  Pan-­‐‑African  Congress,  Dar  es  Salaam.  
1994:  “Seventh”  Pan-­‐‑African  Congress.  Kampala.  
2004:  AU  inaugurates  a  permanent  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural  Council.  
  







Precedents  and  Provenance:  Role  Models  for  the  OAU  &  AU    
  
The  OAU  was   the   first  permanent   institutionalisation  of  Pan-­‐‑Africanism.  All   founders  
of   the  OAU  were  also  members  of   the  United  Nations  Organisation   (UNO),  and  six  were  
also   members   of   the   League   of   Arab   States   (LAS).   They   were   familiar   with   these   inter-­‐‑
governmental   organisations’   aims   and   procedures.   The   LAS   was   founded   in   1945   to  
“coordinate   the  political  activities”,  and  “safeguard  the   independence  and  sovereignty”  of  
its  members.  Its  Council  procedure  was,  like  the  UNO,  the  senate  principle  of  one  state  one  
vote.  It  had  a  number  of  special  committees  for  economics,  finance,  public  health,  and  social  
welfare.  
Article   8   specified   the   principle   of   non-­‐‑interference   in   the   domestic   affairs   of   any  
member  state:  each  state  “shall  respect  the  form  of  government”  in  all  other  states.  Some  of  
its  members  were  absolute  monarchies;  others  were  authoritarian  regimes.  Its  Council  met  
twice   per   year   (Article   11);   between   sessions   it   had   a   General   Secretariat,   a   Secretary-­‐‑
General,  and  assistant  officials.  (Article  12;  Pact  of  the  League  of  Arab  States)  




Analysis  indicates  that  the  League’s  definition  of  an  “Arab  state”  is  political,  rather  than  
one   of   language   or   colour.   Three   current   LAS  member   states   are   black   nations   that   have  
Arabic   as   their   second,   not   home   language:  Comoros   (Swahili),  Djibouti   (Somali  &  Afar),  
and  Somalia   (Somali).  The  LAS  was  non-­‐‑aligned   through   the  Cold  War  decades.  Even   its  
official  website  makes  no  claims  of  peacekeeping  history,  and  its  proposals  for  a  free  trade  
area  are  not  yet  operationalised.  
Upon  independence,  each  African  state  was  admitted  to  the  UNO,  so  all  OAU  members  
were   also   UN   members.   The   UN   aims   to   maintain   international   peace   and   security,   to  
develop   friendly   relations   among   nations,   to   achieve   international   cooperation,   and   to  
harmonise   international   relations.      The   Charter   of   the   UN   includes   Article   2(7)   which  
stipulates  non-­‐‑interference  in  the  domestic  affairs  of  member  states.  Only  on  a  case-­‐‑by-­‐‑case  
basis  could  the  Security  Council  order  a  Chapter  Seven  military  force  against  a  state  which  
was  “a  grave  threat  to  international  peace”,  but  not  for  reasons  of  domestic  repression  and  
dictatorship.   The   five   permanent   members   of   the   UN   Security   Council   –   China,   France,  
Russia,   United   Kingdom,   and   the   USA   –   have   a   veto   over   all   such   decisions.      UN  
membership   was   founded   on   an   all-­‐‑in   universality   principle,   including   all   dictatorships.  
The   only   exclusions   were   two   of   the   defeated   former   Axis   powers   being   delayed   in  
admission,   although   they   became   democracies,   until   1956   for   Japan,   and   until   1973   for  
Germany.    
The  draft  name  of  the  OAU  was  originally  the  Organisation  of  African  States,  (Wolfers:  
1976:  21-­‐‑24,  205,  212)  and  in  both  style  and  substance  the  OAU  was  arguably  modelled  on  
the  Organisation  of  American  States.  The   latter  was   founded  by  a  Charter   in  1948,  with  a  
lineage  going  back  to  1890.  Article  19  of  the  Bogotá  Charter  emphasised  non-­‐‑interference  in  
the   internal  or  external  affairs  of  a  member  state.  This  ensured   that  military  dictators  and  
juntas   were   for   decades   the   great   majority   of   members   in   good   standing.   Tellingly,   this  
principle  was  only  overruled  to  suspend  Cuba  between  1962-­‐‑2009   for  adopting  a  Marxist-­‐‑
Leninist   form  of  government,  but  not   in  any  of  the  numerous  cases  of  coups  d’état  by  anti-­‐‑
communist  dictators.  
The  OAS  charter  was  revised  and  extended  over   the  decades.  At   the   time  of   the  OAS  
founding,  it  too  ran  through  summits  of  heads  of  government,  ministers  of  foreign  affairs,  a  
general   secretariat,   and   specialised   organisations.   It   later   adopted   in   1969   an   American  
Convention  on  Human  Rights,  in  1970  the  new  organ  of  a  General  Assembly,  and  in  1979  an  
Inter-­‐‑American   Court   of   Human   Rights.   The   civil   wars,   repression,   and   torture   in,   for  
example,  Guatemala,   and  other   states   (Chamarbagwalaa  &  Moránb:   2011:   41-­‐‑61)      indicate  
that  the  OAS  was  unable  to  implement  its  rhetoric  on,  and  lip  service  to,  democracy,  human  
rights,   and   the   rule   of   law.  OAS  peacekeeping   attempts   have   been   few   and   insignificant.  
These  arguably  mostly  legitimated  US  military  intervention.  
The  Association   of   South-­‐‑East   Asian  Nations   (ASEAN)  was   founded   four   years   later  
than   the   OAU,   and   so   confirms   the   conventions   and   mid-­‐‑twentieth   century   milieu   of  
regional  organisations.  Article  2(e)  of   the  ASEAN  Charter  specifies  non-­‐‑interference   in   the  
internal   affairs   of  ASEAN  member   states.   This   clearly   reduces   to   non-­‐‑juridical   lip-­‐‑service  
Article   2(h)   supporting   the   rule   of   law,   and   the   principles   of   democracy.   It   ensures   that  
Article  2(i)  for  the  promotion  and  protection  of  human  rights  is  unenforceable.  For  example,  
no   one   in   ASEAN   objected   to   Indonesia’s   membership,whose   government   had,   over   the  
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three  years  preceding  ASEAN’s  founding,  organised  pogroms  in  which  over  half  a  million  
leftists  and  Indonesians  of  Chinese  ancestry  were  massacred.  (Cribb:  2001:  219-­‐‑239)  
ASEAN,  like  the  OAS,  was  anti-­‐‑communist  throughout  the  Cold  War,  and  has  several  
dictatorships   as   member   states.   Article   20   laid   down   the   procedure   of   decisions   by  
consensus,  with  the  consequence  of  giving  each  member  government  a  veto.     
The  1963  Charter  of   the  OAU,  and  its  subsequent  performance,  was  neither  better  nor  
worse,   but   representative   of   its   mid-­‐‑twentieth   century   contemporaries   in   the   developing  
countries.   The   organisation   was   to   be   run   by   an   Assembly   of   Heads   of   States   and  
Governments,  a  Council  of  Ministers,  and  a  General  Secretariat.   (Article  VII).   It  “solemnly  
affirmed”  non-­‐‑interference  in  the  internal  affairs  of  all  its  member  states,  and  respect  for  the  
sovereignty  and  territorial  integrity  of  each  state  (Article  III,  reiterating  Article  II).  Like  the  
UNO,  OAS,  and  LAS,   the  OAU  was   founded  on  an   inclusionary  basis   for  all   countries   in  
Africa,   regardless   of  where   their   governments   stood   on   the   spectrum   from  democratic   to  
dictatorial.  
It  went  further  than  the  charter  of  contemporary  regional  organisations  by  proposing  a  
Commission   of   Mediation,   Conciliation,   and   Arbitration   (Article   VII)   and   defence   and  
security   cooperation   (Article   II   (2)(f)).   While   it   was   unable   to   implement   these,   the   two  
proposals   kept   resurfacing   decades   later   in   episodic   negotiations,   and   were   finally  
operationalised  in  the  AU.  
In  1963,  only  amongst  the  wealthy  countries,  was  the  six-­‐‑year  old  European  Economic  
Community   (EEC)  an  order  of  magnitude  ahead  of  other  regional  organisations.  This  was  
founded  on  the  principle  that  countries  which  may  join  must  already  be  democracies,  and  
must  demonstrate  fiscal  and  financial  stability.  
The   economic   drivers   of   globalisation   show   a   crowded   chronology   in   their   impacts  
upon  regional  organisations.  The  upgrading  of  the  General  Agreement  on  Trade  and  Tariffs  
(GATT)  into  the  World  Trade  Organisation  (WTO)  in  1992  is  the  same  year  as  the  Treaty  of  
Maastricht,   where   the   EU   finally   achieved   its   1962   goal   of   a   common  market.   The   USA  
responded   by   proposing   the   North   American   Free   Trade   Area   (NAFTA)   in   1992.   The  
cascade  of  responses  saw  a  host  of  existing  regional  organisations  revise  and  upgrade  their  
founding   treaties:  ASEAN,   the   Economic  Community   of  West  African   States   (ECOWAS),  
the  Preferential  Trade  Area   (PTA)  renamed  the  Common  Market  of  Eastern  and  Southern  
Africa   (COMESA),   the   Southern  African  Development  Coordinating  Committee   (SADCC)  
renamed   the   Southern   African   Development   Community   (SADC),   and   the   revival   of   the  
East  African  Community  (EAC).  The  OAU  made  a  qualitative  shift,  starting  with  the  1991  
treaty  for  an  African  Economic  Community  (AEC),  and  culminating  in  the  2002  formation  
of  the  AU.  
The  AEC  Treaty  of  Abuja  (1991)  and  the  Constitutive  Act  of  the  AU  (2000)  might  be  the  
most  ambitious  attempts   in   the  world  at  norms  diffusion.  The  Treaty  proposed   for  Africa  
the  wholesale   importation   of   the   institutions,   procedures,   human   rights   values   and   other  
norms  of  the  EU  –  all  to  be  phased  in  over  an  elaborate,  thirty-­‐‑four  year  schedule  matching  
the   1957-­‐‑91   evolution   of   the  EU.   This  was   re-­‐‑iterated  nine   years   later   by   the  Constitutive  
Act.  
These  developments  were  clear  when  53  African  heads  of  governments  signed  the  1991  
Treaty  of  Abuja  to,  amongst  other  things,  found  a  Pan-­‐‑African  Parliament,  a  Court  of  Justice  
and  Human  Rights,  an  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural  Council,  an    African  Central  Bank,  an  
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African  Monetary  Fund,  and  an  African  Investment  Bank.  Existing  OAU  entities  that  were  
re-­‐‑titled   include   the   Secretariat   becoming   the   Commission,   the   Council   of   Ministers  
renamed   as   the  Executive  Council,  with   a   Permanent  Representatives  Committee   being   a  
counterpart   to   the  EU’s  Permanent  Representatives  Committee   (COREPER).  Similarly,   the  
Abuja  Treaty   started  with   regional   economic   communities  which   should  be  progressively  
upgraded  to  become  free  trade  areas,  then  customs  unions,  next  common  markets,  followed  
by  monetary  unions,  and   finally  merged   into  a  continental   single  market.  The  AEC  treaty  
also  paved  the  way  for  the  later  constitutive  act  in  that  it  did  not  repeat  the  1963  Charter’s  
emphasis  on   sovereign   independence  of   its  member   states,  but   shifted   the  phraseology  to  
“inter-­‐‑dependence”   (Article   3(a)),   and   “inter-­‐‑state   co-­‐‑operation,   harmonisation   of   policies  
and  integration  of  programmes”  (Article  3  (c).  
The  norms  diffusion   from   the  EU  helped   the   re-­‐‑engineering  of   the  OAU   into   the  AU  
become  a  qualitative  shift.  First,  while  the  OAU  had  a  founding  Charter,  a  name  shared  by  
many  organisations,  the  AU  had  a  Constitutive  Act.  This  nomenclature  evokes  the  constituti
on  of  a  state,  and  “act”  is  the  terminology  used  for  a  statute  passed  by  a  parliament.  
Second,   the   AU’s   mandate   shows   a   dynamic   contestation   between   the   OAU’s   1963  
nationalist   narrative   versus   a   twenty-­‐‑first   century   human   rights   assertiveness.   That   the  
conflicting  clauses  are  deliberately  placed  adjacent  in  the  Act  appears  to  reflect  a  stalemate  
between  the  Mbeki-­‐‑Obasanjo  thrust  against  the  more  repressive  rulers.  The  Constitutive  Act  
dialectically  confronts  articles:  
  
 3(b)  defend  sovereignty  &  independence  versus  
 3(c)  accelerate  political  integration  of  Africa  
 3(h)  promote  &  protect  human  rights  &  peoples’  rights  




 4(g)  non-­‐‑interference  in  internal  affairs  versus  
 4(h)  right  to  intervene  in  genocide,  crimes  against  humanity,  &  other  grave  
circumstances  
 3(g)  promote  democratic  principles  and  institutions,  popular  participation  and  good  
governance  (italics  added)    
  
And  thus  giving  a  potential  mandate  for  human  rights  activists  to  lobby.  The  AU  
Constitutive  Act  is  a  world  first  for  international  organisations  in  recognising  a  right  of  
humanitarian  intervention  in  a  sovereign  independent  state.  The  Pan-­‐‑African  Parliament  
protocol  was  the  first  regional  parliament  in  the  world  to  prescribe  a  minimum  quota  for  
women  MPs:  one-­‐‑fifth,  though  the  PAP  has  not  yet  refused  to  accredit  national  slates  of  
MPs  who  arrive  without  one  women  MP.  
  
The   italicised  words   in   the  Constitutive  Act’s   section   three   are   of   utmost   importance.  
Political   integration   is   an   intention   to   concede   far   more   sovereignty   than   cooperation.  
Likewise,   use   of   the   nomenclature   Parliament   implies   the   ultimate   grant   of   law-­‐‑making  
powers   and   supra-­‐‑national   authority   over   at   least   certain   agreed   areas.  Clearly,   the   other  
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diametrical  confrontations  between  article  4(g)  and  (h)  will  be  decided  by  diplomatic  power  
struggles  on  a  case-­‐‑by-­‐‑case  basis  each  time  conflict  comes  to  a  climax  in  Comoros,  Congo,  
Côte   d’Ivoire,   Mali,   Mauritania,   Madagascar,   the   Sudan,   and   Zimbabwe.   Diplomats   and  
other  lobbyists  will  battle  to  accumulate  a  majority  of  votes  on  their  side.    
The   Pan-­‐‑African   Parliament   (PAP)   inauguration   came   in   2004,   with   Midrand,   South  
Africa,  designated  as   the  permanent  site.  How  does   the  PAP  compare  with  other  regional  
parliaments?   Only   the   European   Parliament,   the   central   American   Parlacen,   and   the  
ECOWAS  Community  Parliament  are  older.2  The  European  Parliament  first  met  in  1958,  but  
only  upgraded  to  direct  elections  in  1979,  and  has  only  been  able  to  assert  power  since  the  
late   1990s.  Out  of   these   regional  parliaments,   only   the  European  Parliament   and   the  PAP  
post  onto  their  websites  an  on-­‐‑line  Hansard  record  of  their  debates.  
The  PAP  started  determined  lobbying  to  acquire  authority,  and  increase  its  budget  and  
other   resources.   The   PAP   has   set   up   ten   portfolio   committees,   including   one   for  
Cooperation,   International   Relations,   and   Conflict   Resolution.   (http://www.pan-­‐‑african-­‐‑
parliament.org)  The  2005  AU  budgetary  reform  enabled  the  AU  for  the  first  time  to  pay  not  
half,  but   the   full  PAP  allocation   in   its  budget.  Simultaneously,  Mandela   lent  his  stature   to  
the   launch   of   the   Pan-­‐‑African   Trust   Fund   in   2006,   which   started   with   German   and   UN  
donations  (BUSINESS  DAY:  2006b).  By  2010  the  PAP  budget  rose  to  $14  million,  the  second  
largest   item   in   the   AU   budget   (Assembly/AU/Dec.287(XIV)).In   addition,   individual  
countries  are  responsible  for  their  own  MPs  remuneration  and  per  diem  expenses,  while  the  
host  country  South  Africa  covers  all  capital  and  some  operational  costs  of  the  PAP.  
PAP  MPs  gave  priority   to   objecting   to   their  marginalisation   by   both   the  Assembly   of  
Heads  of   State   and  Government,   and   the  Peace  &  Security  Council   (PSC),   in  negotiations  
over  Darfur  and  other  peacekeeping  operations.  They  assert  their  right  to  be  involved  in  all  
future  peace  negotiations  (BUSINESS  DAY:  2006a;  THE  WEEKENDER:  2006).  The  PAP  has  
sent  fact-­‐‑finding  missions  to  Chad,  Côte  d’Ivoire,  Darfur,  Mauritania,  Rwanda,  the  Sahrawi  
Arab   Democratic   Republic,   and   Sudan;   and   election   observers   to   Angola,   Democratic  
Republic  of  Congo  (DRC),  Kenya,  and  Zimbabwe.      The  PAP  has  the  right  to  receive  annual  
reports   from   the  PSC,   and   to   ask   for   interim   reports   (PSC  PROTOCOL:  ARTICLE  8).  The  
PAP   is   also   lobbying   for   co-­‐‑decision   over   the   AU   budget,   oversight   over   all   AU  
Commission   directorates,   and   to   send   monitoring   teams   to   all   national   elections   in   AU  
members.  One  remarkable  aspect   is  that  the  Abuja  treaty  anticipated  that  founding  a  Pan-­‐‑
African   Parliament   would   be   amongst   the   toughest   achievements   to   accomplish,   and   so  
scheduled  it  for  the  final  stage  forty  years  ahead,  ending  in  2034  (Article  6(2)(f)(iv)).  But  the  
PAP  started  three  decades  ahead  of  schedule.  
Civil  society  was  swift  to  use  the  space  opened  up  by  the  PAP.  The  first  demonstration  
outside   the  PAP  came   from  over  one  hundred  Ethiopians  protesting  on  9  December  2005  
against   the   killing   of   women   and   children   in   Ogaden.   Fifty   Ugandans   followed   on   30  
December  2005  with  a  demonstration  against  the  detention  of  their  leader  back  home,  and  
the  banning  of  their  meetings  (http://www.pan-­‐‑african-­‐‑parliament.org).  
A  common  criticism  of  the  PAP  is  that  since  it  comprises  MPs  indirectly  elected  “on  a  
continent   characterised   by   rubber-­‐‑stamp   parliaments   and   authoritarian   regimes”   (LULIE:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2  http://www.parlacen.org.gt/documentos/PDF_English.pdf;  
http://www.parl.ecowas.int/english/indexus.htm  
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2012:19)  it  cannot  be  expected  to  itself  be  different.  Its  track  record  outlined  above  indicates  
where   it  has  sought   to  support   those  striving  for   free  and  fair  elections  and  democracy   in  
their  own  countries.        The  PAP   intends   to  move   from   indirect   to  direct   elections  within  a  
shorter  period  than  the  two  decades  this  took  the  European  Parliament.  In  January  2012  the  
PAP  shifted  its  session  to  Addis  Ababa,  to  facilitate  its  MPs  lobbying  the  AU  heads  of  state  
summit  for  greater  authority.  It  will  need  to  sustain  assertive  lobbying  for  as  many  decades  
as   the   European   Parliament   did   to   win   more   power,   including   direct   elections.   One  
advantage   of   late   starters   is   to   avoid   others’  mistakes.   European   Parliament   elections   are  
marked  by   such   low  percentage  polls   that   they  undermine   its   legitimacy.   It  would  be   far  
more   advisable   for   the   PAP   to   evolve   to   direct   elections   by   simply   adding   an   additional  
voting  paper  during  each  state’s  own  general  election.  
Analysis   of   the  PAP  must   point   out   that   its   intrinsic   importance   is   far  more   than   the  
terrain  it  opens  up  for  oversight  over  the  AU  executive,  and  later  legislative  authority.  First,  
the  AU  is  constituted  as  an  inter-­‐‑governmental  organisation,  comprising  an  elite  of  heads  of  
government,   cabinet  ministers,   diplomats,   and   civil   servants.  Nowhere   in   the  world  may  
civil   servants  publically   criticise   their  own  governments.  The  PAP  and  ECOSOCC  are   the  
first  AU  institutions  that  broaden  participation  to   include  civil  society.  As  part  of   this,   the  
PAP  has  the  potential  to  take  the  lead  towards  the  democratisation  of  both  the  AU  itself  and  
the   continent.  PAP  and  ECOSOCC  are   the   terrains  of   contestation   through  which   the  AU  
may  evolve  from  a  union  of  presidents  to  a  union  of  peoples.  
Pan-­‐‑Africanism   so   far   remains   confined   to   a   middle-­‐‑class   intellectual   elite.   Its  
aspirations   are   not   shared   by   the   working   class.   Amongst   the   unemployed   and   under-­‐‑
employed   in   shantytowns,   the   current   reality,   from   South  Africa   (2008)   to   Libya   (2000  &  
2011),  is  of  xenophobic  pogroms  and  riots  against  African  immigrants  from  other  countries.  
Out  of  one  billion  Africans,  only  around  one  thousand  are  full-­‐‑time  participants  in  the  AU  
family   of   organisations,   plus   the   political   heads   of   state   and   diplomats   episodically  
participating   in   its   summits,   conferences   and   other  meetings.  Direct   elections   to   the   PAP  
would  significantly  broaden  participation  in  Pan-­‐‑Africanism.  
Founded  in  2005,  the  ECOSOCC  brings  in  civil  society  through  statutory  provision  for  
130   seats   for   NGOs   in   the   continent.   ECOSOCC’s   second   innovation   also   has   no   EU  
precedent  –  it  also  allocates  20  seats  for  diaspora  NGOs.  This  reverses  the  marginalisation  of  
the   African   diaspora   since   1963   and   mitigates   the   state-­‐‑centric   domination   of   Pan-­‐‑
Africanism.   This   is   the   first   institutionalisation   of   the   links   between   a   continent   and   its  
diaspora.   Globally,   this   appears   to   be   a   historic   third   after   the   Israel-­‐‑Zionism  movement  
relationship;  and  India’s  legislation  for  Overseas  Citizens  of  India  to  include  biennial  Pravasi  
Bharatiya  Divas.    
The   AEC   Treaty,   which   came   into   effect   during   1994,   proposed   thirty-­‐‑four   years   of  
stages   towards   Nkrumah’s   proposed   African   common   market,   which   followed   the   EU’s  
own  evolution  during  the  thirty-­‐‑four  years  between  1957  and  the  1991  signing  of  the  treaty  
in  Abuja.  
Much   of   Africa   implemented   the   first   two   stages   on   schedule.   While   the   Economic  
Community   of   Central   African   States   (ECCAS)   and   the  Union   du   Maghreb   Arabe   (UMA)  
remain  dormant,  COMESA,  ECOWAS,  EAC,  and  the  SADC  are  operationalised.  COMESA,  
EAC  and   the  SADC  each   formed   free   trade  areas   (FTAs)   ahead  of   the  2017  deadline.  The  
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EAC  is  a   leading  example  of  what  the  literature  calls  fast-­‐‑tracking  or  variable  geometry:   it  
has  deepened  economic  integration  into  a  customs  union  ahead  of  schedule.  
The  AEC  treaty  proposed  that  each  regional  community  become  a  FTA  by  2017,  then  a  
customs  union  by  2019,  before  the  different  customs  unions  could  merge  into  a  continental  
common  market  by  2021,  culminating  in  a  single  continental  currency  by  2028.    
Rob   Davies,   South   African   Minister   of   Trade   &   Industry,   argues   that   a   trajectory  
imitative   of   EU   integration   is   unrealistic:   the   formal   deepening   of   economic   integration,  
following   orthodox   economic   theory   of   the   1950s.   (DAVIES:   2011)   The   AU’s   Minimum  
Integration   Programme   or   MIP   (2009)   saw   the   first   major   revision   of   the   Abuja   Treaty.  
Current   plans   are   to   broaden   economic   integration   by   creating   and   merging   Free   Trade  
Areas  before  deepening  each  into  customs  unions  and  then  common  markets.  The  AU  now  
aims   at   achieving   a   Continental   Free   Trade   Area   (CFTA)   by   a   notional   goal   of   2017  
(ASSEMBLY/AU/Decl.1(XVIII).  COMESA,  EAC  and  SADC  propose  to  solve  the  problem  of  
their  overlapping  memberships  by  a  tripartite  merger  process  that  formally  began  in  2011.  
The   MIP   commends   this   as   a   model,   urging   that   ECOWAS,   ECCAS,   CENSAD   &   AMU  
should  merge.   (MIP,   pp.30,   99).   Davies   anticipates   that   a   continental   free   trade   area  will  
precede  further  attempts  to  broaden  existing  customs  unions,  or  forming  common  markets.  
The  inauguration  of  the  PSC  in  2004,  and  the  de  facto  birth  of  the  African  Stand-­‐‑by  Force  
(ASF)   -­‐‑   (commencing  with   the  peace-­‐‑keeping  deployment   in  Burundi   in   2003)   -­‐‑  mark   the  
start  of  the  AU’s  shift  from  adoption  of  EU  institutions  to  adaptation  of  ECOWAS  organs.  
While  the  convention  has  been  for  academics  to  write  that  the  AU’s  PSC  is  adapted  from  the  
UN  Security  Council,  it  is  clear  that  Nigeria  and  other  ECOWAS  members  of  the  AU  drew  
upon  their  own  experiences  to  shape  an  AU  evolution  which  adapted  ECOWAS  precedents,  
down   to   even   the   nomenclature.   Few   scholars   seemed   to   have   spotted   the   obvious  
precedents.   (See   Table   2)   For   example,   each   of   the   five   permanent   members   of   the   UN  
Security  Council  may  veto  any  intervention.  By  contrast,  the  PSC  may  order  even  military  
intervention  by  a  two-­‐‑thirds  majority,  so  minimizing  paralysis.  The  UN  has  no  equivalents  
to  the  Panel  of  the  Wise,  but  ECOWAS  does  have  a  precedent  (PSC  Protocol:  2002).    
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Table  2    
ECOWAS  PRECEDENTS  FOR  AU  
  
ECOWAS  post-­‐‑1993   AU  post-­‐‑2004  
Mediation  &  Security  Council   Peace  &  Security  Council  
Ecowarn   Continental  Early  Warning  System  
Council  of  Elders   Panel  of  the  Wise  
ECOMOG,  later  ESF   ASF  
Defence  Council,  &  
Defence  Commission  
Military  Staff  Committee  
decisions  by  two-­‐‑thirds  majority   decisions  by  two-­‐‑thirds  majority  
Source:  Gandois:  2009;  Protocol  Relating  to  the  Establishment  of  the  Peace  and  Security  
Council  of  the  African  Union:  2002  
  
To  date,  peace-­‐‑keeping  is  arguably  the  AU’s  major  activity.  There  have  been  over  three  
hundred  meetings  of  PSC,   compared   to   the   average   two  dozen  meetings  of  other  organs.    
Not   only  have  boots   on   the  ground   in   Sudan,   Somalia,   and   elsewhere  grown  beyond   the  
15,000  soldiers  and  police  envisaged  for  the  start-­‐‑up  of  the  African  Stand-­‐‑by  Force  in  2010;  
the   AU’s   25,000-­‐‑strong   component   in   AU   and   hybrid   peacemaking   missions   such   as  
UNAMID   and  AMISOM  means   that   there   is   already   a   de   facto  African  Standing   Force,   in  
continuous  action  for  over  six  years,  and  now  with  a  permanent  Military  Staff  Committee.3  
Another   dimension  where   ECOWAS   is   ahead   of   the   AU   is   in   the   composition   of   its  
legislature.   The   PAP,   like   the   East   African   Legislative   Assembly,   is   based   on   the   senate  
principle   of   equal   representation   for   each   state   regardless   of   population.   By   contrast,   the  
ECOWAS  Parliament,  hosted  in  Abuja,  has  followed  the  European  Parliament  with  national  
representation   weighted   for   population   through   a   formula   of   digressive   proportionality  
(See  Table  3).  It  can  surely  be  only  a  matter  of  time  before  the  PAP  evolves  towards  this,  as  
it   currently   has   a   1000:1   inequality   between   the   value   of   a   vote   in   Nigeria   and   the  
Seychelles.  
     
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3http://unamid.unmissions.org/Default.aspx;  http://www.newvision.co.ug/news/629931-­‐‑museveni-­‐‑
applauds-­‐‑uk-­‐‑for-­‐‑amisom-­‐‑support.html  
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Table  3    
  
ECOWAS  PARLIAMENT’S  DEGRESSIVE  PROPORTIONALITY  FORMULA  
  
35  MPs:  Nigeria  
    8  MPs:  Ghana  
    7  MPs:  Côte  d’Ivoire  
    6  MPs:  Burkina  Faso,  Guinea,  Mali,  Niger,  Senegal  





The   ECOWAS   Commission,   headed   by   a   President,   has   since   2006   supranational  
authority  binding  on  members  in  agreed  areas.  The  Community  Acts  passed  by  ECOWAS  
Authority   are   binding   without   slow   ratifications   by   national   parliaments.   These   2006  
reforms   include   “strengthening   of   supra-­‐‑nationality”,   adoption   of   a   new   legal   regime  
(decisions  directly   applicable   in  member   states  &  by   the   institutions”   (ibid.  p.1);   and   that  
delegations  of  member  states   to  ECOWAS  Parliament  “should   take  account  of   the  gender  
approach   and   reflect   the   diversity   of   political   sensitivities   represented   at   the   national  
assemblies”  (ibid.p.3  ECOWAS  Newsletter:  2006).  
  
PEACE  &  SECURITY  ARCHITECTURE  
  
This   article   is   fifty-­‐‑four   years   after  Kwame  Nkrumah   proposed   an  African   army   and  
African   High   Command.   While   the   French   military   and   the   US   Africom   are   based   in  
Djibouti,   how   far   has   Africa   itself   progressed?   The   brief   chronology   in   Table   4   tracks   a  
glacial  but  cumulative  progress.  The  chronology  charts  episodic  meetings  during  the  1960s-­‐‑
1980s,  followed  by  escalating  peacekeeping  and  peacemaking  from  the  1990s  onwards.    
     






CHRONOLOGY:  PEACE  AND  SECURITY  ARCHITECTURE  
  
1958:     Nkrumah  proposes  an  African  Legion  &  African  High  Command  
1963:     OAU  Defence  Commission,  1st  meeting,  Accra  
   OAU  founds  Liberation  Committee,  with  Defence  Committee,  Dar  es  Salaam  
1965:     OAU  Defence  Commission,  2nd  meeting,  Freetown  
1971:     OAU  Defence  Commission,  5th  meeting,  Addis  Ababa  
1979:     OAU  Defence  Commission,  6th  meeting  
1981:     OAU  1st  military  peacekeeping,  Chad,  arrives  December  1981    
1982     OAU  1st  military  peacekeeping,  Chad,  withdraws  June  1982  
1990:     ECOMOG  peacemaking  in  Liberia  
1991:     OAU  NMOG  in  Rwanda,  55  observers  
1993:     OAU  Mechanism  on  Conflict  Prevention,  Management  and  Resolution  founded  
1994-­‐‑95   OAU  OMIB  in  Burundi,  52  observers  
1995:     OAU  Peace  Fund  established;  decision  to  set  up  peacekeeping  brigades  in  each  of  five  
regions  
1996:   OAU  1st  Chiefs  of  Staff  meeting  
1997:     OAU  2nd  Chiefs  of  Staff  meeting,  Harare  
1998:   SADC  peacemaking  in  Lesotho    
   ECOMOG  peacemaking  in  Sierra  Leone  
   ECOMOG  peacemaking  in  Guinea-­‐‑Bissau  
   OAU  sets  up  Situation  Room  in  its  Conflict  Management  Centre  
OAU  OMIC  in  Comoros,  29  observers  
2002:     Protocol  Relating  to  the  Establishment  of  the    
   Peace  and  Security  Council  of  the  African  Union  signed  
2003:     3rd  Chiefs  of  Staff  meeting  
   AU  starts  peacekeeping  mission  in  Darfur,  Sudan  
2004:   EU  Peace  Facility  [Fund]  founded  
   Committee  of  Intelligence  &  Security  Services  of  Africa  (CISSA)  founded  
   African  Centre  for  Studies  &  Research  on  Terrorism  founded  
2005:     Algerian,  Egyptian,  Libyan,  Mauritanian,  SADR,  &  Tunisian  Chiefs  of  Defence  Staff  meeting  
in  Tripoli:  MOU  for  North  African  Regional  Capability    
                           AU  Non-­‐‑Aggression  and  Common  Defence  Pact  signed  
2007:     Continental  Early  Warning  System  (CEWS)  set  up    
   Panel  of  the  Wise  set  up  
                           Memorandum  of  Understanding  on  Cooperation  in  the  Area  of  Peace  &  Security  between  the  
AU,  the  RECs  and  the  Coordinating  Mechanisms  of  the  Regional  Standby  Brigades  of  Eastern  
Africa    &  Northern  Africa.      
   AMISOM  peacemakers  arrive  in  Somalia,  slow  build-­‐‑up  to  17  000  
2010:       ASF  Military  Staff  Committee  founded,  meets  monthly,  advisory,  no  executive  powers.  
2012:       Current  operational  strength  of  AU  military  in  AU  and  hybrid  missions  total    
   25  000  military  and  police  personnel.  
  
In  formal  terms,  the  African  Stand-­‐‑by  Force  has  not  yet  been  inaugurated.  But  de  facto,  
the  cumulative  peacekeeping  and  peacemaking  missions  have  seen  continuous  deployment  
and  action  for  nine  years,  and  now  tally  25  000  boots  on  the  ground.  This  is  quantitatively  
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and  qualitatively  vastly  more  peacekeeping   than  ASEAN,  LAS,  or   the  OAS  dared   to  even  
attempt.   It   is   second   to   only  UN  peacekeeping.     Another  major   advance   in   both  AU   and  
hybrid  AU-­‐‑UN  operations  has  been  its  evolution  from  their  traditional  role  of  peacekeeping  
between  two  front  lines  in  conventional  war,  as  between  Algeria  and  Morocco  in  the  1960s,  
or  Ethiopia  and  Eritrea  in  the  1990s,  to  complex  peace  enforcement  in  civil  wars  as  in  Darfur  
or  the  DRC  “with  multiple  factions  that  are  often  mutating”  (Adebajo:  2011:  242).  Success  in  
such  circumstances  requires  developing  sophisticated  multilateral  diplomacy  in  addition  to  
underwriting  a  robust  deployment  of  military  forces.    
In   contrast   to   the   1960s   record   of   unilateral   Belgian,   French   and   UN   military  
intervention  in  the  Congo  and  elsewhere,  twenty-­‐‑first  century  peace-­‐‑making  in  Africa  now  
has   the   UNO   and   EU   operating   hybrid   missions   as   partnerships   with   the   AU.   African  
agency  is  more  evident.  
These  developments  are  part  of  the  AU  emerging  as  a  player  in  global  governance  that  
asserts   African   agency   to   negotiate   the   terms   of   the   continent’s   engagement   with   both  
peace-­‐‑making  in  Africa  and  its   international  relationships.  The  growing  stature  of  the  AU,  
compared  to  the  earlier  OAU,  saw  a  new  development.  In  2006,  the  USA  became  the  first  of  
fifty-­‐‑three   states   to   formally   accredit   ambassadors   to   the   AU.   Alongside   these,   regional  
organisations   such   as   the   EU,   Arab   League,   and   the   Organisation   Internationale   de   la  
Francophonie   (OIF)   followed   suit   (http://www.au.int/en/partnerships).   No   state   had  
contemplated  accrediting  diplomats   to   the   former  OAU,  but   they   clearly  decided   that   the  
AU  carries  more  weight  in  international  affairs.  
Conversely,   the  AU  started   to  have  an   embryonic  diplomatic   corps.   It  has  permanent  
diplomatic   missions   in   New   York   to   service   its   coordination   of   African   delegates   to   the  
UNO;  a  mission  to  UN  specialised  agencies  in  Geneva,  a  mission  to  the  EU  in  Brussels,  and  
one   in   Cairo   to   the   Arab   League.   It   also   runs   a   diplomatic   office   in   Washington   DC,  
headquarters  of  the  World  Bank  and  the  International  Monetary  Fund  (IMF)  as  well  as  the  
US   capital.   DialloTelli   (then   OAU   Secretary-­‐‑General)   negotiated   with   U   Thant   (then   UN  
Secretary-­‐‑General)   in   1965   that   the   UN   and   its   Economic   Commission   for   Africa   (ECA)  
would  prepare  research  and  papers  for  the  OAU.  The  African  Development  Bank  has  also  
partnered   with   the   ECA   and   OAU   to   draft   bargaining   positions   for   the   African   bloc   in  
economic   negotiations   (Wolfers:   1976   :99,   102).   These   diplomatic   alliances   augmented   the  
OAU  and  AU  capacity  above  its  own  budget  and  personnel  resources.  
  
HUMAN  RIGHTS  AND  JUDICIAL  ACTIVISM  
  
Amongst  the  first  erosion  of  the  OAU  Charter’s  Article  3  prohibiting  intervention  in  the  
internal   affairs   of   states   was   the   signing   of   the   African   Charter   on  Human   and   Peoples’  
Rights  in  1981.  This  empowered  the  African  Commission  on  Human  and  Peoples’  Rights  to  
officially  comment  on  issues  of  the  rule  of  law  and  human  rights.  While  rhetoric  cannot  yet  
remedy  ground  truth  in  authoritarian  jurisdictions,  lip  service  opens  up  a  gap  with  reality  
that  provides  an  arena  for  mobilization  by  the  continent’s  human  rights  campaigners.  
One   unexpected   development   has   been   judicial   activism   in   two   of   the   new   regional  
courts.   Such   intergovernmental   courts   are   established   by   treaty   to   adjudicate   border   and  
other   disputes   between   governments,   and   between   a   government   and   the   regional  
economic   community.  This   is   the  way   that   the  COMESA  Court  of   Justice  operates.   In   the  
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EU’s   history,   it   took   four   decades   before   the   governments   agreed   that   individuals   could  
appeal   from   the   highest   court   of   their   country   to   the   EU   court.   Gathii   is   the   first   legal  
scholar  to  point  out  that  African  regional  judiciaries:  
  
“entertain  a  broad  range  of  disputes  from  an  extremely  broad  category  of  litigants,  unlike  the  
International  Court   of   Justice,   for   example,  which   only   accepts   cases   from   states   that   have  
accepted  its  jurisdiction…  Many  of  these  judiciaries  …  have  also  often  entertained  cases  that  
are  well   beyond   their   treaty-­‐‑defined   jurisdictional   bases…  Another   feature   that   comes   out  
clearly   is   the  boldness   of   their  decisions   in   relation   to   the   fact   that   they   are   relatively  new  
institutions  operating  in  a  context  in  which  adherence  to  notions  of  national  sovereignty  is    
very  strong”      (GATHII:2011:xxxii)  (emphasis  added).    
  
The  ECOWAS  Community  Court  of   Justice   (ECJ)  asserted   its   jurisdiction  over  human  
rights  within  two  decades,  while  the  SADC  Tribunal  made  a  world  first  for  such  a  regional  
court  when  it  agreed  to  hear  as  its  first  trial  a  human  rights  case,  then  other  human  rights  
cases:  
  
1. ECW/CCJ/APP/04/07  was  a  habeas  corpus  application  on  behalf  of  Ebrima  Manneh,  a  
Gambian   journalist   who   in   2006   was   illegally   abducted   into   secret   detention  
incommunicado.   The   ECOWAS   Court   ordered   both   his   release,   plus   cash  
compensation  for  unlawful  imprisonment  and  loss  of  earnings.    
2. SADC(T)   no.11/2008      concerned   Mike   Campbell,   whose   Zimbabwean      farm   was  
seized,  after  which  the  73  year  old  was  tortured  to  force  him  to  instruct  his  lawyers  
to  abandon  the  SADC-­‐‑T  litigation.  
  
The  AU,  ECOWAS  and  the  SADC  showed  the  same  political  realities  as  the  UNO,  ICJ,  
OAS,  LAS,  and  ASEAN.  They  were  politically  frightened  to  enforce  these  ECCJ  and  SADC-­‐‑
T   court   rulings   on   human   rights.   Indeed,   Mugabe   denounced   the   SADC-­‐‑T   rulings   as  
“nonsense   and   of   no   consequence”(The   Namibian   11   July   2009).      This   inaction   is   the  
opposite  of  repeated  AU  rhetoric,  of  which  its  several  Darfur  resolutions  are  typical:  
  
Assembly  /  AU  /  Dec.221  (XIII)  (2009):  
  
“6.  reiterates  the  AU’s  unflinching  commitment  to  combating  impunity  and  promoting  
democracy,  the  rule  of  law  and  good  governance  throughout  the  entire  Continent,  in  
conformity  with  the  Constitutive  Act.  
7.  condemns  the  gross  violations  of  human  rights  in  Darfur,  and  urge  the  perpetrators  be  




AU  Exc.  16th  ordinary  session,  1  Feb  2010  Addis  Ababa.  
"ʺThe  Executive  Council   [.....]  CALLS  ON  Member   States  which  have  not   yet  done   so…      to  
make   the  declaration  accepting   the   jurisdiction  of   the  Court   to   receive  applications  directly  
from  individuals  and  Non-­‐‑Governmental  Organizations"ʺ  
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Siegmar Schmidt has cautioned that “[t]here is no doubt about the revolutionary 
character of the African Union’s curtailment of state sovereignty, but revolutions can fail” 
(in Besada: 2010:19). So   far,   the   rule  of   law  advocates  have  yet   to  win   their   campaign   to  
import  EU  norms  of  legality  and  justice  to  The  Gambia  and  Zimbabwe.  These  two  test  cases  
are  nevertheless  important,  as  marking  courageous  and  unprecedented  judicial  activism  on  
our  continent.  Its  defeats  and  successes  over  the  next  decades  will  chart  part  of  the  progress  
of  Pan-­‐‑Africanism  towards  “a  continent  of  democracy  …  a  continent  of  good  governance,  
where  …  the  rule  of  law  is  upheld”  that  Mbeki  advocated  for  in  the  AU’s  inaugural  speech  
(Mbeki:  2003:  187).  That  the  AU  and  ECOWAS  fear  to  act  against  even  the  mini-­‐‑state  of  The  
Gambia   is   a   stark   example   of   condoning   repression,   as   that   Government   has   minimal  
resources  to  defeat  a  peacemaking  expedition.  It  speaks  to  the  powerlessness  of  the  African  
Commission  on  Human  Rights  and  People’s  Rights,  based  in  Banjul.  
Nonetheless,   these   landmark   judicial   rulings   that   have   been   politically   unenforceable  
still  have  significant  importance.  They  pull  the  rug  out  from  under  dictators  whose  clichéd  
defence   is   that   human   rights   are   western   cultural   imperialism   that   ignores   African  
traditions.  
  
CORNERSTONES  OF  CONTINENTAL  INTEGRATION:  REGIONAL  ECONOMIC  
COMMUNITIES  (RECs)  
  
The  Abuja   treaty   of   1991   specifies   the   regional   economic   communities   (RECs)   are   the  
geographic  cornerstones  “to  establishing  a  Customs  Union  at  the  continental  level”  (Article  
6(2)(d);   4(2)(a)   &   (b)).   The   Constitutive   Act   of   the   AU   in   2000   commits   the   states   to  
“coordinate   and   harmonize   policies   between   …   regional   economic   communities   for   the  
gradual  attainment  of  the  objectives  of  the  Union”  (2000:  Article  3(l)).  The  PSC  protocol  of  
2002  reiterates  that  “the  regional  mechanisms  are  part  of  the  overall  security  architecture  of  
the  Union”  (Articles  16;  7(j)).  The  2007  MOU  on  Cooperation  in  Peace  and  Security,  which  
includes   ECOWAS,   SADC,   the   East   African   Standby   Brigade   Coordinating   Mechanism  
(EASBRICOM),   and   the   North   African   Regional   Capacity   (NARC),   institutionalises   them  
within  the  AU  (Articles  I,  III).  The  regional  organisations  agree  to  submit  reports  every  six  
months   to   the   AU   Commission’s   chair;   the   AU   Commission’s   chair   will   have   annual  
meetings  with   the   regional   organisations’   chief   executives,   and  open   liaison  offices   in   the  
regional   organisations’   headquarters,   with   reciprocal   arrangements   also   encouraged  
(ArticlesI,  III,  VI,  XVI  (3)(5)(6),  XVIII).  The  AU  liaison  office  to  ECOWAS  opened  in  Abuja  in  
2011.  
Indisputably,   Africa’s   four   leading   RECs   today   are,   in   sequence   of   their   founding:  
ECOWAS,   SADC,   COMESA,   and   the   EAC.   They   have   markedly   different   origins   and  
evolution,   but   some   generic   features.   The   Kenyan-­‐‑born   scholar   James   Gathii   alerts   us   to  
their  dynamics:  
  
  “African   Regional   Trade   Agreements   are   not   predicated   on   a   vision   of   market-­‐‑led  
integration.  Instead,  they  are  largely  designed  as  forums  for  a  variety  of  initiatives”  (Gathii:  
2011:  xxix).  
  
For  example,  the  treaty  formally  titled  “to  establish  an  African  Economic  Community”  goes  
on   to  commit   its   signatories   to  cooperation  “in   every   field  of  human  endeavour”   (emphasis  
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added).  He  draws  attention  to  the  Regional  Economic  Communities  having  “contextualizing  
imperatives  grounded   in  African  history,  politics  and  realities”.  They  are  not  contemplated  
as  purely  trade  agreements,  nor  treated  by  African  heads  of  government  as  legal  obligations  
entailing  punitive   sanctions   for  non-­‐‑compliance,  but   rather  as  “agreements   that   encompass  
…   an   extremely   broad   range   of   areas   of   cooperation”   (See   Table   5).   Operationally,   these  
ostensible  RECs  have  multiple  objectives  including  the  political,  and  have  in  practice  variable  
geometry,  and  multiple  memberships  (Gathii:  2011:  xxvii).      
  




AFRICAN  UNION  FAMILY  
Focusing  on  actually  functioning  entities  
ACRONYMS:  
COMESA  –  Common  Market  of  Eastern  &  Southern  Africa           EAC  –  East  African  Community                                  
ECOWAS  –  Economic  Community  of  West  African  States   NEPAD  –  New  Partnership  for                
Africa’s  Development  
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PEACE	  &	  SECURITY	  
African	  Centre	  for	  Studies	  	  
&	  Research	  on	  Terrorism	  
African	  Standby	  Force	  
Continental	  Early	  Warning	  System	  
Committee	  of	  Intelligence	  	  
&	  Security	  Services	  of	  Africa	  
Military	  Staff	  Committee	  
Peace	  &	  Security	  Council	  
Panel	  of	  the	  Wise	  
CULTURAL	  
African	  Academy	  of	  
Languages	  
Afro-­‐Arab	  Institute	  for	  
Cultural	  	  
&	  Strategic	  Studies	  
CELHTO	  
Economic,	  Social	  &	  Cultural	  
Council	  
Pan-­‐African	  News	  Agency	  
PARLIAMENTARY  






African	  Court	  of	  Justice	  &	  Huma 	  
Rights	  
African	  Commission	  on	  Human	  	  
&	  Peoples’	  	  Rights	  
COMESA	  Court	  of	  Justice	  
EAC	  Court	  of	  Justice	  
ECOWAS	  Community	  Court	  of	  
Justice	  
SADC	  Tribunal	  (temporarily	  
suspended)	  
ECONOMIC	  
African	  Civil	  Aviation	  Commission	  
African	  Commission	  on	  Nuclear	  Energy	  
African	  Development	  Bank	  
African	  Energy	  Commission	  
African	  Export-­‐Import	  Bank	  
African	  Peer	  Review	  Mechanism	  
African	  Petroleum	  Fund	  
African	  Regional	  Standardization	  Organization	  
African	  Tax	  Administration	  Forum	  
Communauté	  Économiqueet	  Monétaire	  de	  l’Afrique	  
Central	  
Common	  Monetary	  Area	  




Inter-­‐African	  Phyto-­‐Sanitary	  Council	  
Inter-­‐African	  Bureau	  for	  Animal	  Resources	  
Inter-­‐African	  Bureau	  for	  Soils	  (BIS)	  
NEPAD	  Planning	  &	  Coordinating	  Agency	  
Pan-­‐African	  Infrastructure	  Development	  Fund	  
Pan-­‐African	  Postal	  Union	  
Pan-­‐African	  Telecommunications	  Union	  
Pan-­‐African	  Veterinary	  Vaccine	  Centre	  
Regional	  African	  Satellite	  	  Communications	  
Organization	  
SADC	  	  
Semi-­‐Arid	  Food	  Grains	  Research	  &	  Development	  
Southern	  African	  Customs	  Union	  
Southern	  African	  Power	  Pool	  
Scientific	  &	  Technical	  Research	  Centre	  
Union	  Économiqueet	  Monétaire	  Ouest	  Africaine	  
Union	  of	  African	  Railways	  
Union	  of	  Producers,	  Transporters	  &	  Distributors	  of	  
Electricity	  in	  Africa	  




130	  continental	  NGOs;	  
plus	  
Business	  sector	  organs	  
Professional	  associations	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Gathi’s   analysis   is  more   insightful   and   nuanced   than  Hélène  Gandois’   argument   that  
African  regional  communities  “were  created  as  economic  communities,  failed  as  such,  were  
later   turned   into   security   institutions   and   have   started   addressing   other   issues   such   as  
human  rights  or  promotion  of  democracy”  (Gandois:2009:24).    
One  intriguing  point  of  analysis  that  emerges  from  Table  5  is  that  while  the  activities  of  
the  AU  family  of  organisations  is  focused  on  peacemaking,  reflecting  current  exigencies,  its  
institutionalisation  is  focused  on  economic  integration  and  development,  reflecting  a  long-­‐‑
term  perspective  and  commitment.  
The   economic   impact   of   a   continental   free   trade   area,   and   even   the   proposed   SADC-­‐‑
EAC-­‐‑COMESA  tripartite  FTA  by  2017  will  be  considerable.  Research  of  the  Mckinsey  Global  
Institute   and  Columbia  University’s  National   Bureau   of   Economic  Research   both   confirm  
that  Africa  has  sustained  for  a  decade  a  broad-­‐‑based  economic  growth  rate  double  that  of  
the  European  and  North  American  countries.  Should  that  continue  for  another  few  decades,  
it  will   certainly   end  Africa’s  marginalisation   (Mckinsey:   2011;  NBER:   2011).      Africa’s   one  
billion  people  include  over  300  million,  34%  of  the  population,  who  are  consumers,  defined  
as   purchasing  power   parity   of   annual   income   over   $3900   (City   Press:   2011),   plus   100   000  
high-­‐‑worth  individuals  worth  one  trillion  USD,  i.e.  average  $10m  each  (Business  Day:  2011).  
A   free   trade  area  or   common  market  of  a  billion  would  be   comparable   to  either  China  or  
India,  and  constitute  the  tenth  largest  GDP  in  the  world.    
Equally   important   as   formal   institutional   integration   is   physical   integration   through  
major   upgrades   of   the   transport   and   energy   infrastructure   between   African   countries.  
Equally   important   too   is   successful   action   against   corruption   and   red   tape   harassing  
transport.   One   South   African   supermarket   company   has   to   spend   $20   000   per   week   on  
import  permits  to  truck  milk  and  meat  to  Zambia.  Another  South  African  retailer  finds  that  
documentation   exempting   it   from   customs   duties   to   transport   clothing   and   food   is  more  
expensive  than  the  customs  tariffs  themselves  between  South  Africa  and  other  SADC  states  
(Business  Day:    2012).  
  
CONTINENTAL  AND  SUB-­‐‑REGIONAL  QUANGOs  
  
The  diverse  organisations  outlined  below  share   three  characteristics.  Few  are   formally  
part   of   the   AU   organogram.   They   are   autonomous   from   national   civil   services.   Their  
members  are  entirely  or  mostly  governments  or  state-­‐‑owned  entities,  or  are  at  least  funded  
by   governments.   This   is   the   definition   of   Quasi-­‐‑Non-­‐‑Governmental   Organisations  
(QUANGOs).  Six  of  these  Quangos  are  listed  on  the  official  AU  website  as  AU  scientific  and  
technical  offices;  one  scholar  lists  another  five  as  OAU  specialised  agencies.  Dozens  of  other  
forums,  institutions,  and  organisations  are  affiliated  in  one  way  or  another  through  treaties,  
MoUs,  or  endorsed  in  AU  resolutions,  or  through  a  continental  or  sub-­‐‑regional  mandate.  
All  of  them  in  one  way  or  another  are  examples  of  Africans  acting  in  multi-­‐‑lateral  ways  
as  a  continent  or  sub-­‐‑region.    Their  headquarters  truly  represent  a  continent,  stretching  from  
Dakar   to   Nairobi,   from   Algiers   to   Johannesburg.   They   construct   Pan-­‐‑Africanism   by  
integrating  the  continent  or  its  regions  in  a  host  of  practical  ways,  from  regional  electricity  
grids  to  continental  project  finance.  These  Quangos  typically  have  annual  meetings,  with  an  
executive  meeting  biannually.  
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Table  6  selects  the  continental  Quangos  active  in  the  key  development  prerequisites  of  
transport,   communications,   and   energy.      Much   literature   in   political   studies,   security  
studies,  and  law,  cover  the  human  rights  dimension  of   the  AU.  Far   less   literature  seeks  to  
analyse  energy,  and  currencies.  The  Comité  Maghrébin  de  l’Electricité  (COMELEC),  Southern  
African   Power   Pool   (SAPP),      and   West   African   Power   Pool   (WAPP)   connect,   even   if  
currently  on  a  small  scale,  nineteen  national  electricity  grids  into  three  regional  grids.  SAPP  
has  been  the  pace-­‐‑setter,  pioneering  the  day-­‐‑ahead  market  (DAM)  for  buying  and  selling  of  
electricity.  Such  regional  networks  are  the  foundations  towards  a  continental  energy  smart  
grid.   In   the   twenty-­‐‑first   century,   such   energy   infrastructure  plays   a   role   analogous   to   the  
importance  of  the  European  Coal  and  Steel  Community  in  the  birth  of  the  EU.  It  allows  for  
more  efficient  use  of   less  expensive  power  generation  facilities,  greater  security  of  supply,  
wider  access,  and  less  vulnerability  to  oil  price  fluctuations.  
     







TRANSPORT,  COMMUNICATIONS,  &  ENERGY  QUANGOs  
(HQs  indicated  at  end)  
  
African  Civil  Aviation  Commission  (AfCAC),  Dakar*  
African  Commission  on  Nuclear  Energy  (AFCONE),  Valindaba  
African  Energy  Commission  (Commission  Africaine  de  l'ʹEnergie),  (AFREC/CAE),  Algiers  
African  Petroleum  Fund  (APF),  Algiers  
African  Regional  Organisation  for  Standardisation  (ARSO),  Nairobi     
Comite  Maghrébin  de  l’électricité  (COMELEC)/(Maghreb  Electricity  Committee),  
HQ  rotates  
Pan-­‐‑African  Telecommunications  Union  (PATU),  Kinshasa*  
Pan-­‐‑African  Postal  Union  (PAPU),  Arusha*  
Regional  African  Satellite  Communications  Organisation  (RASCOM),  Abidjan  
Southern  African  Power  Pool  (SAPP),  Harare  
Union  of  African  Railways  (UAR),  Kinshasa*  
Union  of  Producers,  Transporters,  Distributors  of  Electricity  in  Africa  (UPDEA),  Abidjan  
West  African  Power  Pool  (WAPP)/(Système  d’Echanges  d’Energie  Electrique  Ouest  Africain)  
(EEEOA),  Lagos      
  




The   first   regional   grid   up   and   running   was   the   Comité   Maghrébin   de   l’Electricité  
(COMELEC),  founded  in  1975.  By  2003  Morocco,  Algeria,  Tunisia,  Libya,  and  Egypt  were  all  
inter-­‐‑connected,  with  every  one  of  those  countries  both  importing  and  exporting  electricity  
to  neighbours  during   the  most   recent  year   for  which   statistics   are  published,   2006   (FAÏD:  
2008:  110).    
The   Southern   African   Power   Pool,   established   in   1995,   today   inter-­‐‑connects   nine  
countries   out   of   the   fourteen   SADC   countries.   The   SAPP   established   a   day-­‐‑ahead  market  
(DAM)   for   spot   trading   of   electricity,   (http://www.sappmarket.com)   as  well   as   providing  
the   infrastructure   backbone   through   which   South   Africa   imports   power   from   the  
Democratic  Republic  of  the  Congo  and  Mozambique.  
ECOWAS‘s   revised   1993   treaty   makes   reference   to   “inter-­‐‑connection   of   electricity  
distribution   networks”   (ECOWAS:   1993:   Article   28(2)(d)).   It   founded   the   West   African  
Power   Pool   in   1999   as   a   specialised   agency.   The   ECOWAS   2003   Energy   Protocol   was  
“determined  to  remove  …  barriers  to  trade  in  electricity”  (2003:  PREAMBLE).  By  2007  five  
countries’  grids  had  been   inter-­‐‑connected:  Benin,  Burkina  Faso,  Côte  d’Ivoire,  Ghana,  and  
Togo   (GNANSOUNOU   et   al:   2007).   The   bilateral   connections   between  Mali-­‐‑Senegal,   and  
Niger-­‐‑Nigeria  still  await  being  linked  up  to  complete  a  sub-­‐‑regional  grid  stretching  across  
the  whole  of  west  Africa.    
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The  other  major  continental  Quangos  in  Africa  may  be  analytically  categorised  as  in  the  
financial,   scientific   and   cultural   sectors   (See   Table   7).   Two   reflections   are   pertinent   here.  
First,  there  seems  to  be  duplication  between  the  remit  of  the  existing  African  Development  
Bank  (AfDB)  and  the  proposed  African  Investment  Bank  contemplated  in  the  Abuja  Treaty,  
for  which   a  preparatory   committee   is   set   up   in   Tripoli:   a  merger   or   reconstitution  would  
appear  optimal.  Also,  since  the  era  of  gold-­‐‑backed  fixed  exchange  rates  ended  four  decades  
ago,  there  is  no  reason  to  perpetuate  the  duplication  of  the  IBRD  and  IMF  with  a  separate  
AfDB  and  the  proposed  African  Monetary  Fund:  the  AfDB  and  the  proposed  AMF  will  be  
more   cost-­‐‑effective   as   divisions   of   one   financial   institution.      Similarly,   the   role   of   the  
Development   Bank   of   Southern   Africa,   and   similar   regional   banks   in   ECOWAS   and  
COMESA,  might  also  benefit   from  harmonisation.     Second,   the  Pan-­‐‑African   Infrastructure  
Development   Fund   (PAIDF)   established   three   global   records.   It   is   the   world’s   first  
continental   sovereign   wealth   fund,   as   opposed   to   a   national   fund.   It   is   the   globe’s   first  
hybrid   public-­‐‑private   such   fund,   and   it   is   the   first   whose   mandate   is   specifically  
infrastructure.  
     




QUANGOs  IN  OTHER  SECTORS  
  
FINANCIAL  
African  Development  Bank  (AfDB   ),  Tunis  
African  Export  -­‐‑  Import  Bank  (AFREXIMBANK),  Cairo  
African  Tax  Administration  Forum     (ATAF),  Pretoria  
African  Trade  Insurance  Agency,  Nairobi  
Arab  Bank  for  Economic  Development  in  Africa  (BADEA),  Khartoum  
Association  of  African  Central  Banks  (AACB  /  ABCA),  Dakar  
Banque  Centrale  des  États  de  l'ʹAfrique  de  l'ʹOuest    (BCEAO),  Dakar  
Banque  des  États  de  l'ʹAfrique  Centrale  (BEAC),  Yaoundé  
COMESA  Infrastructure  Fund,  Port  Louis  
Development  Bank  of  Southern  Africa  (DBSA),  Pretoria  
East  African  Development  Bank,  Kampala  
ECOWAS  Bank  for  Investment  &  Development  (EDIB),  Lomé  
Industrial  Development  Corporation  of  South  Africa  (IDC),  Pretoria  
NEPAD  Planning  and  Coordinating  Agency,  Midrand  
Pan-­‐‑African  Infrastructure  Development  Fund  (PAIDF),  Johannesburg  
[COMESA]  PTA  Bank,  Bujumbura  
[COMESA]  Regional  Investment  Agency,  Cairo  
Zep-­‐‑Re  PTA  Reinsurance  Company,  Nairobi  
  
(NOTE:  the  IDC,  notwithstanding  the  “South  Africa”  in  its  name,  has  had  its  statutory  mandate  
expanded  to  be  continental,  as  has  the  DBSA).  
  
SCIENTIFIC  
African  Regional  Organisation  for  Standardisation  (ARSO),  Nairobi  
Inter-­‐‑African  Bureau  for  Animal  Resources  (IBAR),  Nairobi*  
Inter-­‐‑African  Phyto-­‐‑Sanitary  Council  (IAPSC),  Yaoundé*  
Inter-­‐‑African  Bureau  for  Soils  (BIS),  Lagos  
PAN-­‐‑African  Veterinary  Vaccine  Centre  (PANVAC),  Debra  Zeit  
Semi-­‐‑Arid  Food  Grains  Research  &  Development  (SAFGRAD),*  Ouagadougou  
Scientific  &  Technical  Research  Centre  (STRC),*  Lagos  
  
CULTURAL  
African  Academy  of  Languages  (ACALAN),  Bamako*  
Afro-­‐‑Arab  Institute  for  Cultural  &  Strategic  Studies,  Bamako  
Centre  d’Etudes  Linguistiques  et  Historiques  par  Tradition  Orale  (CELTHO)  /  (Centre  for  Linguistic  &  
Historical  Study  of  Oral  Tradition),  Niamey*  
Pan-­‐‑African  News  Agency  (PANA),  Dakar  #  
  
*  listed  on  the  official  AU  website  as  AU  scientific  and  technical  offices  
#  listed  by  El-­‐‑Ayouti  as  OAU  Specialised  Agencies  
  
  
One  major  challenge  for  the  AU  and  ACALAN  is  that  linguistic  and  translation  funding  
in  Africa   is   from  only   former   colonial   powers,   to   sponsor   the   language   of   their   vanished  
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empires,  such  as  French,  and  to  a  much  lesser  extent,  English  and  Portuguese.  This  means  
that  Kiswahili   and  Tamazight,   for   example,   as   the  most  multi-­‐‑state  of   indigenous  African  
languages,  enjoy  no  such  donors.    While  the  OAU  formally  added  Kiswahili  onto  its  list  of  
official   languages   in   1984   –   a   year   ahead  of  Portuguese   –   the  OAU   in  practice   lacked   the  
budget  to  ever  hire  translators  to  use  it  for  the  remaining  two  decades  of  its  existence.  It  was  
only  the  PAP  in  2004  that  for  the  first  time  actually  translated  documents  into  Swahili  and  
used   it   on   its   official  website.   Even  now,   this   is   limited   to   solely   the  PAP,   and   limited   to  
only  a  symbolic  number  of  documents  on  its  website.  
Culture   is   also   the   sole   terrain   to   date   that   has   broader   players   than   the   elite   of  
politicians   and   intellectuals   who   support   Pan-­‐‑Africanism.   The   African   Cup   of   Nations  
soccer  series,  and  the  Confederation  of  African  Athletics  games  are   the  only  activities   in  a  
pan-­‐‑African   format   that   today   enjoy  mass   participation   and   viewership  measured   in   the  
tens  of  millions.  
  
CONTINENTAL  CIVIL  SOCIETY  (NGOs)  
  
It   would   be   a   major   research   project   on   its   own   to   compile   an   inventory   of   all  
continental  and  regional  non-­‐‑governmental  organisations  and  civil  society  organisations  in  
Africa.  They  range  the  alphabet  from  the  African  Airlines  Association,  founded  in  Accra  in  
1968,   and   the   African   Union   of   Architects,   founded   in   1981   in   Lagos   through   to   the  
Association  of  African  Universities,  founded  in  Accra  in  1967,  and  the  African  Association  
of  Zoos  and  Aquaria  founded  in  1989  in  Pretoria.  Others  include  the  All-­‐‑Africa  Council  of  
Churches,  founded  in  1963  in  Nairobi,  the  African  Medical  Association,  founded  in  2006  in  
Johannesburg,  and  the  African  Women  Lawyers’  Association,  founded  in  1998  in  Accra.  
The  most   vibrant   continental   academic   association   is   the  Council   for  Development   of  
Social   Research   in   Africa,   CODESRIA.   There   are   many   continental   discipline-­‐‑specific  
learned  societies,  such  as   the  African  Association  of  Biological  Nitrogen  Fixation,   founded  
1982.     The  African  Publishers’  Network  was  convened   in  1992   in  Abidjan.  Abidjan   is  also  
headquarters  for  the  African  Parliamentary  Union,  founded  in  1976.  
The   African   Stock   Exchange   Association,   founded   in   1993   in   Nairobi,   represent  
corporate   interests.  There  are  numerous  continental  business   sector  organisations,   such  as  
the   Inter-­‐‑African   Coffee  Organisation  which   has   grown   to   twenty-­‐‑five   countries   since   its  
founding  in  1960  (www.iaco-­‐‑oiac.org).    
More   important   than   an   exhaustive   inventory   of   these   civil   society   organisations   is  
analysis  of  their  impact  for  the  constructivist  theoretical  framework.    All  of  these  develop  a  
continental  perspective  for  their  profession,  business  sector,  class,  or  institutional  base.  They  
deepen  multilateral  ways  of  thinking  and  acting.  In  a  global  governance  framework  where  
major   decisions   on   the   business   environment   are   taken   outside   the   continent,   Africa  
increasingly  needs  coordinated  bargaining  positions.  
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DONORS  AND  DEPENDENCY  
  
The  OAU,  AU,   and   some   regional   organisations   confront   an   additional   challenge   not  
shared   by   the   EU,   ASEAN,   LAS,  MERCOSUR,   or   OAS:   self-­‐‑sufficiency.   Only   during   the  
OAU’s  inaugural  year  was  its  membership  fees  essentially  paid  up,  after  which  over  twenty  
states  were  in  arrears  (Wolfers:  1976:178-­‐‑179).  Throughout  the  thirty-­‐‑nine  years  of  the  OAU  
and   the   first   four   years   of   the   AU,   the   majority   of   member   governments   defaulted   on  
paying   their   annual   assessments,   and   those  who  paid  usually  paid   late,   and  only   in  part.  
AU  members   had   developed   the   habit   of   claiming   there  was   an   “administrative   budget”  
which  was  compulsory  and  an  “operational  budget”  which  was  voluntary:  
  
“What  is  the  use  of  paying  salaries  if  you  do  not  pay  them  to  do  anything?”  (Dlamini-­‐‑Zuma:  
2006).  
  
The  consequences  included  that  OAU  programmes  could  not  be  implemented;  that  the  
OAU  Defence  Commission   could   only  meet   twice   during   the   1960s;   and   that  most   funds  
and  weapons  for  liberation  movements  were  paid  not  from  the  OAU  Liberation  Committee,  
but  directly  by  the  Soviet  and  Chinese  Governments  (Wolfers:  1976:  189).  At  the  start  of  the  
AU  this  meant  that  it  could  only  allocate  the  PAP  half  of  its  budget.  The  PAP  had  to  adjourn  
its  sessions  half  way  through;  and  could  only  hire  24  of  the  needed  94  support  staff  (Cape  
Times:  2006).    
The   AU   sought   to   remedy   dependency   on   donors   through   a   major   revision   of   its  
funding  formula.  First,  from  2006  the  big  five  –  Algeria,  Egypt,  Libya,  Nigeria,  South  Africa  
–  agreed  that  on  top  of  their  own  annual  membership  fees  they  will  pay  75%  of  the  annual  
budget,   with   the   rest   of   the   fifty   members   paying   the   remaining   25%.   Second,   the   AU  
moved   to  off-­‐‑book  budgeting.  Countries  who  seek   the  prestige  of  hosting  AU   institutions  
must   themselves  pay   the  capital  costs  and  some  of   the  running  costs.  Examples  are  South  
African  funding  of   the  PAP;  Tanzania  for   the  African  Court  of   Justice  and  Human  Rights;  
and  Ethiopia  for  the  AU  HQ  and  PSC.  Third,  the  AU  spun  off  some  expenses  by  launching  a  
number   of   dedicated   funds   for   specific   purposes.   It   set   up   a   “Peace   Facility”   to   receive  
donations   for  peacekeeping  operations.  Mandela   leant  his  prestige   to   launch  a  PAP  Trust  
Fund  (Business  Day:  2006b).      
The  most  serious  remaining  donor  dependency,  probably  over  nine-­‐‑tenths  of   funding,  
is   for  AU  peacekeeping  operations,   and   that   the  SADC  and  COMESA  depend   for  around  
half  their  budgets  through  foreign  donors.  
Where   there   is   consensus   between  AU  members   and   dominant   external   powers,   this  
results   in   the   AU’s   largest   peacekeeping   and   peacemaking   operations   to   date,   as   in   the  
Sudan   and   Somalia.   But   where   western   powers   and   major   AU  members   held   divergent  
views,   as   over   the   Libyan   2011   civil   war,   the   AU   found   itself   marginalised   by   NATO  
powers.  Divergent  positions  between  African  governments  themselves  can  sometimes  also  
be  blamed  on  donor  dependency.  Mbeki  has  queried  if  a  state  that  receives  half  its  revenue  
from  its  former  colonial  power  may  be  categorised  as  sovereign  (Mbeki:  2012).  
The  same  donor  dependency  is  evidenced  in  many  NGOs  in  Africa.  Over  90%  of  their  
funding  may  come  from  not  membership  fees,  but  foreign  donors,  typically  a  single  donor.  
When  that  donor  stops  giving,  the  NGO  collapses.  One  case  in  point  pertinent  to  readers  of  
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this   journal   is   the   African   Association   of   Political   Science   (AAPS).   This   vulnerability   is  
aggravated  by  the  fact  that  many  such  voluntary  organisations  are,  in  developed  countries,  
run  unpaid  by  salaried  scholars  in  addition  to  their  day  job.  Low  salaries  and  scant  research  
funds  in  most  of  Africa  mean  that  when  the  executive  of  a  voluntary  organisation  succeed  
in  winning  extra-­‐‑Africa  donors,  then  they  write  into  that  organisation’s  budgets  salaries  for  
paying  themselves.  One  consequence  is  that  the  proportion  of  such  an  organisation’s  budget  




In  Nkrumah’s  prescient  book,  Africa  Must  Unite,  published  in  1963  -­‐‑  with  nine  reprints  
and  editions  since  -­‐‑  he  advocated  “The  ultimate  goal  of  a  United  States  of  Africa”  (143)  with  
“a  continental  parliament”  (221):  
  
“In  my  view  …  a  united  Africa  –  that  is,  the  political  and  economic  unification  of  the  African  
continent  –  should  seek  three  objectives:  
  
Firstly,   we   should   have   an   overall   economic   planning   on   a   continental   basis.   This   would  
increase   the   industrial   and  economic  power  of  Africa….  The   lesson  of   the  South  American  
republics  vis-­‐‑à-­‐‑vis  the  strength  and  solidarity  of  the  United  States  of  America  is  there  for  all  
to  see  …  We  should  therefore  be  thinking  seriously  now  of  ways  and  means  of  building  up  a  
Common   Market   of   a   United   Africa   […]   Such   a   [continental]   Government   will   need   to  
maintain  a  common  currency,  a  monetary  zone  and  a  central  bank  of  issue.  […]  
  
Secondly,  we  should  aim  at  the  establishment  of  a  unified  military  and  defence  strategy.  …  
For   young  African   States,   who   are   in   great   need   of   capital   for   internal   development,   it   is  
ridiculous   –   indeed   suicidal   –   for   each   State   separately   and   individually   to   assume   such   a  
heavy  burden  of   self-­‐‑defence,  when   the  weight  of   this  burden  could  be  easily   lightened  by  
sharing  it  amongst  themselves.  […]  
  
The   third   objective   we   should   have   in   Africa   stems   from   the   first   two   which   I   have   just  
described.   If   we   in   Africa   set   up   a   unified   economic   planning   organization   and   a   unified  
military  and  defence  strategy,  it  will  be  necessary  for  us  to  adopt  a  unified  foreign  policy  and  
diplomacy   …   The   burden   of   separate   diplomatic   representation   by   each   State   on   the  
Continent  of  Africa  alone  would  be  crushing,  not   to  mention  representation  outside  Africa.  
The  desirability   of   a   common   foreign  policy  which  will   enable  us   to   speak  with   one  voice  
inthe   councils   of   the   world,   is   so   obvious,   vital   and   imperative   that   comment   is   hardly  
necessary.”  […]  
  
Under   a   major   political   union   of   Africa   there   could   emerge   a   United   Africa,   great   and  
powerful,  in  which  the  territorial  boundaries  which  are  the  relics  of  colonialism  will  become  
obsolete   and   superfluous   […]      Here   is   a   challenge   which   destiny   has   thrown   out   to   the  
leaders  of  Africa”(Nkrumah:1998:  218-­‐‑222).    
  
Thirty-­‐‑one   years   after   Nkrumah   published   this,   the   Treaty   of   Abuja   for   an   African  
Economic  Community   came   into   effect.   Forty-­‐‑one   years   later,   the   Pan-­‐‑African  Parliament  
held   its   ceremonial   inauguration.   Forty-­‐‑six   years   later,   the   NEPAD   Planning   and  
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Coordination  Agency  was   formed   to   address   continental   infrastructure   development   and  
broad  macro-­‐‑economic  policy.  Forty-­‐‑eight  years   later,  African  peacekeeping  missions   total  
25  000  boots  on   the  ground.  And   the   technical   steering   committee   for   the  African  Central  
Bank  meets   in  Abuja,   preparatory   to   its   intended   opening   in   2021,  which  would   be   fifty-­‐‑
eight  years  after  Nkrumah’s  advocacy.    
Also,   as  Nkrumah   foresaw,  out  of   fifty-­‐‑six   current  governments   in  Africa,  only  Egypt  
and   South  Africa   can   afford   to  maintain   embassies   in   all   of   the   other   countries.   The  AU  
Headquarters  in  Addis  Ababa,  and  the  UN  Headquarters  in  New  York,  are  the  only  places  
where  all  of  them  have  diplomats  in  the  same  town.  
  
This  article’s  major  conclusions  are:  
  
First,   Pan-­‐‑Africanism   has   provided   the   political   will,   and   globalisation   the   economic  
driver,  that  sustain  this  project  of  continental  integration.  
Second,   the   AU,   with   sixty-­‐‑three   traceable,   operationalised   institutions,   has   clearly  
evolved   institutionally,   including   free   trade   areas   and   operational   peace-­‐‑making,   more  
successfully   than   any   of   the  ASEAN,   the   LAS,  MERCOSUR   or   the  OAS.  Only   the   EU   of  
wealthy   countries   is   orders   of   magnitude   ahead.   In   2006   the   AU   started   formal  
harmonisation  and  integration  with  the  RECs.  The  planned  tripartite  merger  of  SADC,  EAC,  
and  COMESA  is  the  trailblazer  towards  a  continental  Free  Trade  Area.  The  continental  GDP  
is  significant  and  increasing.  
Third,  if  the  OAU  became  a  club  of  dictators,  the  AU  is  now  a  contested  terrain  between  
authoritarians   and   democrats,   with   some   judicial   activists   unexpectedly   leading   the   way  
ahead  of  politicians.  The   regional   courts,   and   the  embryonic  PAP  and  ECOSOCC  deserve  
future  scholarly  attention  in  this  regard.  
Fourth,   a   myriad   of   continental   QUANGOs,   NGOs,   professional   and   business  
associations,  are  weaving  a  multi-­‐‑dimensional  fabric  of  continental  integration  in  every  area  
from  airlines,  energy,   ICT,   transport,   to  universities.   In   the  AU  era,   these  make   the  whole  
greater  than  the  sum  of  the  inter-­‐‑governmental  parts,  and  have  few  equivalents  in  the  OAU  
epoch  of  the  last  century.  These  form  economic  and  social  forces  that  buttress,  supplement,  
and  reinforce  the  state-­‐‑centric  linkages.       
Fifth   is   a   dimension   of   the   AU   where   reality   is   in   advance   of   rhetoric.   The   African  
Standby  Force  has  had  its  formal  inauguration,  scheduled  for  2010,  postponed  without  one  
public  word  on  a  new  timetable.  But  AU  peacekeepers  have  grown  to  over  25  000  boots  on  
the  ground,  mostly  in  the  DRC,  Sudan,  and  Somalia.  The  ASF  has  de   facto  evolved  into  an  
African   Standing   Force.   That   is,   it   does   not   consist   of   troops   on   standby   for   episodes   of  
intermittent   secondment.   Its   boots   on   the   ground   have   seen   continuous   action   since   2003,  
nine   years   ago.   The   first   decade   of   the   twenty-­‐‑first   century   also   saw   a   regional   and  
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